The cacophony surrounding microfinance regulation has left little room for the voice asking some fundamental questions that should ideally be guiding the debate on any reform.
The pro-regulation lobby has been worried about the recent suicides of indebted borrowers in Andhra Pradesh which they claim is a direct result of a) many MFIs chasing few borrowers and therefore bullying poor people into taking loans they do not need, b) charging very high interest rates for these loans and c) using coercive tactics to ensure repayment of the loans, so much so that some even encouraged poor people to commit suicides so that the MFI could get their claims. On the other hand are claims of government conspiracy to promote its own bank-linked SHG model which suffered due to stiff competition from the MFIs.
While allegations on both sides sound horrific, they beget the question of how true these really are, how pervasive these are amongst the plethora of MFIs that exist, and consequently and most importantly, what should the response be. Given the complexity of the industry, the allegations and the information asymmetry it is extremely difficult to understand exactly what is going on. Here is a nice survey article on the problems of AP which in turn points out to several others.
The MFI gross loan portfolio in India stood at USD 4.6 billion and is said to have a a borrower base of of 26 million in 2009*. These span a variety of structures (NBFCs or not; for-profit or not) and operational models, including different forms of collection of funds, different lending and recovery practices, different funding sources including commercial banks and donor agencies and a distribution of interest rates.
If a few MFIs are the culprits, then there is little to gain by brandishing the whole sector as 'bad'. An article in the FE discusses this issue. The response needs to ensure that in taking action against fraud, we do not shut off an industry that has been providing much needed credit access to those who have been left out by the banking sector in India.
The pro-regulation lobby has been worried about the recent suicides of indebted borrowers in Andhra Pradesh which they claim is a direct result of a) many MFIs chasing few borrowers and therefore bullying poor people into taking loans they do not need, b) charging very high interest rates for these loans and c) using coercive tactics to ensure repayment of the loans, so much so that some even encouraged poor people to commit suicides so that the MFI could get their claims. On the other hand are claims of government conspiracy to promote its own bank-linked SHG model which suffered due to stiff competition from the MFIs.
While allegations on both sides sound horrific, they beget the question of how true these really are, how pervasive these are amongst the plethora of MFIs that exist, and consequently and most importantly, what should the response be. Given the complexity of the industry, the allegations and the information asymmetry it is extremely difficult to understand exactly what is going on. Here is a nice survey article on the problems of AP which in turn points out to several others.
The MFI gross loan portfolio in India stood at USD 4.6 billion and is said to have a a borrower base of of 26 million in 2009*. These span a variety of structures (NBFCs or not; for-profit or not) and operational models, including different forms of collection of funds, different lending and recovery practices, different funding sources including commercial banks and donor agencies and a distribution of interest rates.
If a few MFIs are the culprits, then there is little to gain by brandishing the whole sector as 'bad'. An article in the FE discusses this issue. The response needs to ensure that in taking action against fraud, we do not shut off an industry that has been providing much needed credit access to those who have been left out by the banking sector in India.
Do we want to only regulate outright fraud, or setting of interest rates? Do we want to ensure that information is available? Do we want to oversee all the processes or just new products? Or do we want to do all of the above? Would we treat all the agencies similarly? Would we treat all the products similarly? What would be the cost of doing so? What about borrower responsibility? Sure, the borrowers are poor, but does it absolve them of the responsibility of taking multiple loans knowing fully well that they do not have the ability to repay? When does responsibility shift from MFIs that lure to borrowers who get lured? This is a very difficult question, but one that needs to be asked.
To regulate the MFIs without understanding the issues that both lenders and borrowers face would be jumping the gun too soon and in a few years create the problem of too-much-thoughtless regulation that we have all too often encountered in India.
The whole issue also needs to be looked at in the context of laws and regulations that already exist. For example, would MFIs be covered under fraud protection laws prevalent in the country? If not, is there something special about MFIs that requires a separate agency? What about laws for creditors as well? For example, would a MFI be covered under the SARFAESI if debtors default?
The Andhra Pradesh ordinance certainly does not seem to have addressed any of the issues. In fact it has managed to cease operations of all MFIs by a stroke of a pen in a matter of days. Even if one believes that the government is right in its intent, such haphazard actions by the state hurts potential investment and business, which whether one likes it or not, are key to generating income and jobs.
If anything, the MFI regulation debate in this country is in need of some serious public-policy rethink keeping in mind that throwing the baby with the bath water is not the ideal way to go forward.
*Source: http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/region/South%20Asia